The following analysis revisits the 1968 treatise Death of the Dollar by William F. Rickenbacker, examining its central claims about monetary policy, the gold standard, and the dollar’s fate. While the book warned of a looming financial collapse driven by lax policy and fiat-money dynamics, history offers a more nuanced trajectory. This reexamination situates Rickenbacker’s arguments within the broader arc of postwar monetary policy, the Federal Reserve’s evolving toolkit, and the enduring resilience of the U.S. dollar as the world’s premier reserve asset. By delving into the key themes he raised—from the ascent of fiat currency to the consequences of government spending, and from persistent trade imbalances to the global currency contest—we aim to illuminate why the alarm bells have persisted for decades, even as the dollar remains dominant in global finance. The purpose is not to dismiss concerns about debt, inflation, or policy missteps, but to assess the likelihood and timeline of a fundamental shift away from the dollar given the current macroeconomic and geopolitical landscape.
Removal Of The Gold Standard
In Death of the Dollar, the author grounds his critique in a pivotal historical pivot: the ending of the gold standard and the transition to fiat money. The book, published in 1968, predates the decisive policy move by President Richard Nixon that effectively severed the dollar’s link to gold, a move widely described as closing the gold window and marking the formal birth of the fiat monetary system. Rickenbacker’s thesis posits that without a gold anchor regulating the supply of dollars, monetary authorities would increasingly resort to expansive money creation to fund deficits, setting the stage for inflationary pressures and a depreciation of the currency. He argues that such a tendency toward “money printing” would escalate if the central bank’s discretionary powers were unconstrained, creating an environment of economic instability and eroding purchasing power for households.
A deeper unpacking of this argument reveals a nuanced distinction between the political economy of money creation and the mechanics of central banking. Rickenbacker correctly anticipated that removing gold as a fixed constraint would enlarge the Federal Reserve’s latitude to influence the monetary base and credit conditions. He foresaw that this flexibility could feed speculative episodes and, in extreme cases, foster financial fragility if demand for money and trust in the currency did not keep pace with credit expansion. Yet, a critical area of his analysis—how exactly such expansion translates into inflation and how that inflation translates into a currency decline—requires careful delineation. In modern monetary theory, the relationship between money supply, inflation, and output is mediated by the demand for money, the velocity of circulation, and the productive capacity of the economy. These factors can mute or magnify the inflationary impact of increased reserves, depending on whether credit growth translates into productive investment or merely raises asset prices and financial leverage.
A central counterpoint to the book’s concern about perpetual “money printing” is the distinction between central-bank liabilities (reserves) and the broader money stock that actually circulates in the economy. The Federal Reserve does not “print” currency in the sense of physically manufacturing dollars into the economy; rather, it creates reserve balances that banks can leverage to extend loans and thereby expand credit. This distinction matters because the credit channel—how much debt is issued, who borrows, and what those funds are used for—drives real outcomes for growth, inflation, and the value of the currency. Productive debt, which finances investments that raise future output, can promote growth while keeping inflation in check as supply expands alongside demand. Conversely, unproductive debt drains resources, depresses productivity, and can exacerbate deficits in ways that pressure the currency and widen inflationary risks.
Within this framework, a key theme emerges: while the gold standard offered a fixed anchor, the absence of such an anchor does not inevitably spell doom for a currency. The monetary framework that governs a modern economy relies on a complex interplay of policy objectives, market expectations, and macroprudential safeguards. In the wake of the fiat transition, the U.S. has experienced periods of rapid credit expansion, financial crises, and episodes of disinflation and inflation. The argument to be drawn from Rickenbacker’s analysis is less about a binary fate—fiat money inevitably leading to catastrophe—and more about the quality of policy choices, the discipline of fiscal policy, and the resilience of the financial system under stress. The broader lesson is that the removal of the gold standard did not produce an immediate, uniform pathway to a weaker dollar; instead, it unfolded in a series of policy calibrations, crises, and reforms that have shaped the dollar’s role in global finance.
The mechanics of policy response—how the Fed uses interest-rate adjustments, balance-sheet operations, and macroprudential controls to manage demand, growth, and inflation—have evolved substantially since the 1960s. The Fed’s balance-sheet expansion during times of crisis, the development of open-market operations as the core tool of monetary policy, and the use of unconventional measures during structural disruptions have changed the playbook dramatically. The net effect is that the relationship between gold, fiat currency, and the dollar’s stability is not simply a function of gold’s absence but a function of trust, credibility, and the effectiveness of policy in stabilizing prices and supporting employment. In this sense, the core warning of the book—policy decisions matter for the dollar’s long-run value—remains salient, even as the precise mechanism of monetary adjustment has shifted from gold-discipline to policy credibility and macroeconomic stabilization.
A broader implication of the gold-standard debate is the recognition that the architecture of a modern monetary system balances freedom for monetary authorities with the discipline imposed by market expectations. The absence of a gold anchor does not doom a currency to perpetual depreciation; it creates incentives for prudent policy, transparency, and credible commitment to price stability. The question then becomes whether contemporary policymakers have maintained credible commitments to price stability and sustainable fiscal practices in the face of rising deficits and competing economic priorities. Rickenbacker’s insistence on the dangers of unbounded monetary expansion serves as a cautionary note for readers and policymakers: while fiat currency affords flexibility, it also amplifies the importance of disciplined governance, transparent communication, and effective oversight to manage inflation expectations and sustain confidence in the currency.
The Fed’s Evolving Role and Monetary Policy Landscape
Rickenbacker’s critique of the gold standard emphasizes the central bank’s new-found autonomy after fiat money took hold. In the decades since his book appeared, the Federal Reserve has further expanded its role beyond a lender of last resort to a central actor in stabilizing the macroeconomy through a wide array of instruments. The evolution of monetary policy has included not only traditional interest-rate setting and reserve requirements but also more nuanced tools such as quantitative easing, balance-sheet normalization, and forward guidance. These instruments have been deployed with the aim of maintaining stable inflation and supporting robust employment, especially during episodes of financial stress and economic downturn.
The tension between monetary flexibility and inflation control remains central to the debate about the dollar’s future. When policy is slack, asset prices can surge, and credit can chase higher risk exposures, creating financial instability and potential currency depreciation. When policy is tight, inflation can be reined in, but economic growth may cool and unemployment may rise. The delicate balancing act requires sophisticated modeling, real-time data interpretation, and a willingness to adjust stance in response to new information. In practice, the Fed’s ability to adapt to crises—such as financial shocks or disruptions to global supply chains—has underscored the resilience of the dollar, even as critics warn that excessive intervention can sow the seeds of longer-term distortions.
Thus, the removal of the gold standard did not simply vanish the risk of inflation; it reframed how monetary policy must operate. The Fed’s credibility, the transparency of its policy signals, and the efficiency of the financial system in transmitting policy impulses to the broader economy are now central to understanding the dollar’s staying power. This shift reflects a broader evolution in macroeconomic governance: a system where monetary policy is not constrained by a metallic anchor but instead guided by policy targets, data-driven decision-making, and a framework designed to maintain price stability and sustainable growth over time. The argument that fiat currency inevitably leads to monetary disaster has become increasingly contingent on how well policymakers implement reforms, maintain credibility, and address structural economic challenges without destabilizing expectations about future inflation.
Fed Flexibility: A Double-Edged Sword
In one essential respect, Rickenbacker’s thesis about the dangers of excessive central-bank flexibility rings true. Easy-money regimes have often been associated with speculative booms, misallocated investments, and periods of financial fragility, including modern analogs to past crises. The central point remains that flexibility can be a beneficial instrument for crisis mitigation, liquidity provision, and stabilization when faced with systemic risk or severe financial stress. Yet, as the author warned, such flexibility can, if misapplied or mismanaged, contribute to dangerous bubbles and the erosion of long-run economic fundamentals.
Crucially, the modern experience suggests that the dollar often shines brightest in times of global uncertainty. During financial crises, when risk appetite contracts and liquidity becomes scarce, the dollar tends to strengthen as a safe-haven asset. This paradox—that greater monetary policy flexibility can coincide with dollar strength in a crisis—reflects the currency markets’ perception of U.S. credits and the liquidity depth of U.S. financial markets. In short, the dollar’s status as the world’s premier reserve currency benefits from liquidity, depth, and the broad use of U.S. treasury securities in international portfolios. Even when the domestic policy stance appears accommodative, the demand for dollar-denominated assets can rise during periods of global risk aversion, supporting the currency’s stability.
However, the Fed’s actions have also been linked to episodes of asset-price inflation and concerns about wealth concentration. The long-run implications of a monetary-policy regime that emphasizes stabilization, crisis response, and balance-sheet operations raise questions about distributional effects, financial stability, and the potential for asset-price booms that outpace real economic growth. These dynamics are central to contemporary debates about the dollar’s resilience: does policy-driven growth translate into sustained real gains for the broader population, or does it primarily benefit financial markets and capital holders at the expense of more equitable prosperity? Answering these questions is essential for assessing the long-run durability of the dollar’s reserve-status and the credibility of U.S. monetary policy on the global stage.
Excessive Government Spending
One of Rickenbacker’s core concerns centers on the fiscal side of the equation: massive federal expenditures, particularly on social programs and military conflicts, create budget deficits that, in turn, drive upward inflation pressures and erode the dollar’s value. The book’s historical hinge point is the era of large-scale government spending under Lyndon B. Johnson, including the Vietnam War and expansive domestic programs. The author’s worry about inflation in the 1970s was grounded in a real policy debate about the sustainability of deficits in the face of rising social and defense budgets. In the decades since, deflationary pressures and globalization have altered the dynamics in meaningful ways, yet the underlying concern remains relevant: persistent deficits and the composition of government outlays can influence macroeconomic stability, affect inflation expectations, and shape the public’s trust in the currency.
Over time, the global economy has undergone a remarkable transformation. International trade has expanded, supply chains have grown more intricate, and the demand for dollars has become a global phenomenon linked to the currency’s role in settling international transactions, financing deficits, and serving as a store of value for a broad set of households and institutions. The expansion of globalization, in turn, has provided a buffer against some domestic inflationary pressures by enabling the importation of goods at lower costs and expanding comparative advantages for production abroad. This dynamic has allowed the United States to sustain sizable deficits without triggering a systemic collapse in the dollar, as foreign demand for dollar-denominated assets has evolved in step with the growth of the global economy.
Nevertheless, the fiscal trajectory continues to matter. When deficits rise without an equivalent increase in output and productivity, the burden falls on future generations and can affect long-run growth prospects. The debt-to-GDP ratio remains a critical metric for gauging the sustainability of fiscal policy, and the concern remains that rising indebtedness could tighten financial conditions over time if market perceptions shift. While this path does not automatically imply an imminent devaluation of the dollar, it does imply a risk: if confidence in fiscal discipline erodes, the currency could face higher risk premia, greater borrowing costs, and a more challenging inflation-growth trade-off. The historical lens indicates that deficits per se do not determine the fate of the dollar; rather, the structural composition of spending, the growth of output, and the credibility of fiscal policy shape long-run outcomes.
In the modern era, the world’s financial system has partially absorbed the impact of large deficits through the deep liquidity and diversity of U.S. financial markets. Yet, the interplay between fiscal policy and monetary policy remains critical. If deficits are paired with weak policy frameworks, a perception of fiscal unsustainability can undermine confidence and push up inflation expectations, even if the actual inflation rate remains contained in the short run. Conversely, if deficits are channeled toward investments that raise productivity, growth, and long-term competitiveness, the currency can maintain its appeal as a store of value while simultaneously supporting employment and real income growth. The enduring lesson is that the composition and credibility of government spending—rather than the mere scale of deficits—play a decisive role in shaping the dollar’s trajectory.
Dollar Devaluation In Context
Rickenbacker’s case for devaluation hinges on the intuitive relationship between easy money and eroding purchasing power. He posited that expansive Fed policies, especially in an environment without a gold anchor, would drive inflation that would gradually erode the dollar’s purchasing power. The historical record does show that inflation has a long-run cumulative effect on price levels, and by this measure, the dollar’s purchasing power has indeed diminished over many decades. A standard way to illustrate this is to compare the cost of a representative basket of goods and services across eras. For example, prices for basic items in the mid‑20th century—such as a hamburger, fries, and a drink—had substantially different price points from today. In the 1950s, those items were far cheaper, while today’s prices reflect not only inflation but also changes in consumer preferences and the broader structure of the economy.
However, the picture is not simply one of a relentlessly eroding standard of living. Real wages and living standards have generally advanced despite measured inflation. In several periods, wages have risen at a rate that outpaces price increases, contributing to higher real income for many households. This juxtaposition—rising nominal prices alongside rising real incomes—offers a more nuanced view of “purchasing power.” The dollar’s purchasing power is not a static measure; it is shaped by productivity gains, technological progress, and the changing composition of consumption and investment. Crucially, while the dollar’s exchange value versus a fixed bundle of goods has declined over long horizons, the economy’s real output, innovation, and employment potential have also expanded. In short, the relative erosion in the dollar’s nominal purchasing power must be weighed against the tangible gains in standard of living and the capacity of households to purchase more with higher earnings.
The inflationary experience is not uniform across the economy. Some sectors experience price pressures more acutely than others, and the aggregate price level is influenced by a broad set of forces, including commodity markets, supply-chain dynamics, labor markets, and policy choices. The overall narrative is that inflation can act as a tax on money holdings, reducing the real value of cash and short-term savings, while asset prices—particularly in real estate and equities—can rally in ways that offset some of the erosion of cash purchasing power for certain households. For a portion of the population, real wages have stagnated or grown slowly, while others have benefited from wage growth and asset appreciation. The net effect on overall economic welfare depends on the distribution of these gains and the effectiveness of social safety nets and productivity-enhancing investments.
A critical dimension of this discussion is the distinction between price inflation and the broader economic well-being of society. Inflational dynamics interact with wage growth, employment, and productivity, influencing not only consumers’ ability to purchase goods but also the incentives for firms to invest, hire, and adopt new technologies. The long-run question is whether inflationary pressures are persistent or transitory and whether they reflect structural constraints in the economy or cyclical fluctuations. The answer to this question is central to evaluating the claim that dollar depreciation is an inexorable outcome of easy-money policies. The available evidence suggests that while price levels can rise, the broader economy can adapt and continue to generate rising real incomes, provided that productivity and competitiveness remain resilient.
In this context, the section on “Dollar Devaluation In Context” emphasizes that inflation is a long-run macro phenomenon rather than a purely isolated event. The story is not simply that the dollar loses value automatically because the money supply grows. Instead, the ultimate test lies in how policy responds to inflation, how productivity advances, and how households and firms adjust to changing prices. The long-run trend is influenced by policy credibility, supply-side improvements, and the dynamic interplay between demand and supply in the economy. The 1950s-to-2020s arc demonstrates that nominal price increases do not automatically translate into a permanent decline in economic welfare if real incomes rise and productive capacity expands. The dollar’s fate, therefore, cannot be judged solely on inflation metrics; it must be assessed in the context of a broader set of economic indicators, including growth, employment, investment, and international demand for dollar-denominated assets.
Trade and Balance of Payments Deficits
Rickenbacker identifies persistent U.S. trade deficits and ongoing dollar outflows as essential channels through which the currency’s global standing could be undermined. He argues that structural deficits result in dollars leaving the domestic economy to settle international trade and financial transactions, potentially weakening the currency’s international role over time. Yet, the argument also recognizes a countervailing force: the United States has benefited from a robust global demand for dollars, which helps finance deficits by attracting foreign financing. In a global economy with a growing number of participants seeking dollar-based investments and reserves, the demand side of the equation can offset, at least in the short to medium term, some of the outward dollar flows that accompany persistent deficits.
The dynamics of the balance of payments revolve around composition and timing. While goods and services trade deficits imply more dollars flowing abroad, the same dollars often return to the United States through investments in U.S. government securities, corporate bonds, equities, and other dollar-denominated assets. The international demand for dollars is tied to the perceived depth and reliability of U.S. financial markets, perceived economic stability, and the openness of the U.S. economy to capital flows. The ongoing need for U.S. currency arises from the global economy’s scale and the US’s role as a hub for international finance. In this sense, deficits, rather than triggering a sudden loss of confidence, can be balanced by the continued attractiveness of U.S. assets and the strategic advantages of dollar-denominated settlement.
Nevertheless, the persistence of trade deficits and the associated capital outflows do raise material concerns. A higher level of global financial integration implies that any shock—such as a sudden reevaluation of risk, shifts in exchange-rate regimes, or a change in the willingness of foreign holders to accumulate dollar assets—could alter the currency’s status. The argument is not that the dollar must inevitably lose its reserve-currency status, but that sustained deficits paired with policy missteps could erode confidence over time, increasing the cost of capital and potentially altering global currency dynamics. The tension between domestic policy choices and international financing needs underscores the complex, interdependent nature of the dollar’s international role.
The present-day perspective acknowledges that the dollar’s centrality remains compelling for now. The deep, liquid U.S. financial markets, the breadth of institutions that transact in dollars, and the trust placed in U.S. institutions underpin the dollar’s resilience. However, the international landscape is evolving, with rising competition from other economies and potential shifts in how reserve assets are allocated in the future. In this environment, a sustained approach to policy that aligns fiscal restraint with credible monetary stewardship can help preserve the dollar’s prestige and reduce the risk of long-run volatility in its international status. The dialogue around trade imbalances and capital flows thus remains essential for understanding the currency’s trajectory and for policymakers seeking to safeguard macroeconomic stability while fostering a competitive economy.
Rickenback Was Right
The examination of Rickenbacker’s arguments reveals that many concerns he raised have found echoes in subsequent decades. The core warnings about inflation risks from loose monetary policy, the potential for moral hazard in fiscal policy, and the destabilizing effects of large deficits have, in various forms, manifested in the macroeconomic narrative since the 1960s. Yet the most striking counterpoint to the book’s central claim—that the dollar would imminently lose its status as the world’s reserve currency—is that, after more than half a century, the dollar remains the dominant global currency. The persistence of U.S. financial leadership, the depth of its markets, and the gravity of the U.S. economy have reinforced the dollar’s standing despite numerous challenges and shifts in the global landscape.
The discussion above resonates with a broader line of thought: even when warning signs appear, the world often maintains multiple centers of gravity in global finance. In a hypothetical scenario in which the dollar’s dominance could be challenged, several structural factors would have to align differently. First, a credible, rule-based alternative would need to offer equal or greater stability, predictability, and liquidity. Second, the developing global financial architecture would have to be willing to channel enormous flows of capital through an alternative currency, which is a complex, politically charged undertaking. Third, there would need to be a durable, widely accepted framework for international financial cooperation that could replace the established role of the United States in global markets.
Within this framework, the author’s concerns about the fragility of monetary order still carry weight. The potential for policy missteps to amplify inflation, disrupt markets, or erode confidence remains a constant risk, particularly given the inflationary pressures that can emerge from sustained fiscal expansion or external shocks. The idea that the dollar could lose its reserve status is a thought experiment that continues to inform policymakers and market participants. However, the present-day evidence suggests that the world’s financial system continues to anchor expectations in U.S. monetary policy credibility, the breadth of dollar-denominated trade, and the financial stability of the U.S. economy. As a result, while Rickenbacker’s thesis provided a provocative early warning, the actual outcome has shown resilience in the dollar’s dominance, underscoring the complexity of predicting the currency’s long-run fate.
Two key reasons underpin this continuing resilience. First, the United States maintains the most liquid and open capital markets globally, enabling rapid adjustment to shifting demand for dollars. Second, the rule of law, property rights, and mature financial institutions underpin investor confidence in U.S. assets, encouraging ongoing use of the dollar for international transactions, reserves, and financing. While critics argue that this system could face systemic risks if fiscal or monetary policies become unsustainable, the current arrangement remains robust, with the dollar’s primacy reinforced by structural advantages rather than merely by conventional wisdom. The conclusion drawn from this assessment is not that the dollar’s demise is impossible, but that its timeline remains uncertain and highly contingent on policy discipline, global economic developments, and geopolitical factors.
The narrative about the dollar’s fate also intersects with contemporary discussions about the “Four Reasons The Dollar Is Here To Stay,” a framework that highlights the durability of U.S. institutions, the size and openness of the economy, the trust in the rule of law, and the depth of capital markets as fundamental pillars supporting the currency’s enduring status. While the euro offers a potential challenger as a currency of global trade, its own structural vulnerabilities—ranging from political fragmentation to capital-market dynamics—limit its ability to supplant the dollar in the near term. Similarly, while other assets such as gold or cryptocurrencies have captured attention as potential alternates, they cannot realistically supplant a sovereign currency that anchors international finance given the breadth of the dollar’s integration with global commerce. This recognition reinforces the sense that the dollar’s dominance is not solely a matter of historical accident but of structural advantages that are not easily displaced.
The analysis also emphasizes a broader truth: the health of a currency is inseparable from the health of its domestic economy. The risk of a systemic decline in the dollar’s status increases if the United States experiences persistent productivity declines, deteriorating competitiveness, or significant political instability. By contrast, if the United States continues to invest in technology, education, infrastructure, and sound fiscal management while maintaining credible monetary policy, the dollar’s global appeal is likely to persist. The overall takeaway is that Rickenbacker’s warnings are informative and historically significant, but the actual trajectory of the dollar is governed by a confluence of domestic and international factors, many of which have evolved in ways that defy simple causal narratives. The currency’s resilience, therefore, should be understood as a product of policy credibility, market depth, and the interconnectedness of global finance rather than a straightforward outcome of fiat policy alone.
The Global Currency Landscape and The Path Forward
Although the dollar’s position remains unchallenged for now, the global currency landscape continues to evolve. The euro offers a credible regional alternative, complete with established legal frameworks and deep financial markets, but its ability to substitute for the dollar in the global economy is still hampered by political heterogeneity and concerns about fiscal sustainability across member states. The yuan presents a different kind of challenge: as China continues to grow its economy, it also imposes capital controls and regulatory frictions that limit the yuan’s current and near-term international use as a genuine reserve currency. The potential for a gradual internationalization of the yuan exists, yet a credible shift away from the dollar would require a broad reform of financial markets, legal protections, and a willingness among major economies to rebalance the global monetary system in a way that permits a more multipolar reserve architecture.
From a technology-driven perspective, digital currencies and tokenized assets offer potential alternative channels for cross-border payments and settlement. Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies have sparked discussions about decentralized monetary systems, but their price volatility, scalability challenges, and regulatory uncertainties limit their viability as global reserve assets. Even with evolving regulatory approaches, policymakers are unlikely to cede the core function of monetary control to decentralized networks without comprehensive safeguards and macroeconomic implications. In this sense, the future of money is likely to be a continuum rather than a wholesale replacement: the dollar will continue to be deeply embedded in the architecture of international finance, while other currencies and digital innovations gradually increase their presence in specific niches such as cross-border payments, diversification of reserves, and regional trade settlements.
The credibility of U.S. institutions and the strength of the rule of law remain central to the dollar’s enduring appeal. A robust framework for policy coordination, transparent governance, and consistent price stability enhances confidence in the currency’s long-run value. Conversely, policy missteps—such as unsustainable deficits without commensurate growth in productivity or structural reforms—could undermine confidence and invite greater scrutiny of the dollar’s global role. The ongoing policy debate is thus not merely about the present-day monetary stance but about the longer-term trajectory of U.S. economic governance and its influence on international finance.
Conclusion
In reexamining Death of the Dollar and the surrounding debate, several core themes emerge. First, the transition away from the gold standard did not precipitate an automatic or inevitable collapse of the dollar, but rather reshaped the monetary architecture into a framework where policy credibility and macroeconomic stability are vital. Second, the Fed’s expanded toolkit offers powerful means to stabilize the economy, absorb shocks, and support growth, though it also raises concerns about inflation, asset mispricing, and distributional effects. Third, fiscal policy—especially the scale and composition of government spending—remains a critical determinant of long-run macroeconomic outcomes, including inflation expectations and the political durability of the currency’s status. Fourth, while inflation and declines in purchasing power have occurred, they coexist with rising productivity, technological progress, and improved living standards, complicating simplistic readings of “the dollar is dying.” Fifth, the trade and payment dynamics of a highly interconnected global economy show that deficits can be financed through strong foreign demand for dollars, though this ties the dollar’s fate to global confidence in U.S. economic policy and political stability.
Taken together, these insights suggest that the warning bells about the death of the dollar have persisted for decades because they tap into real tensions at the intersection of policy choices, macroeconomic fundamentals, and global financial architecture. Yet the conclusion of this broader analysis is not one of imminent doom but of prudent caution: the dollar’s long-run resilience rests on credible monetary policy, fiscal restraint where feasible, and continued leadership in maintaining a stable, open, and innovative economy. The global financial system has shown a remarkable capacity to adapt to shifts in policy regimes, currency arrangements, and new forms of capital mobility. For those studying monetary history and modern finance, the core takeaway is clear: policy decisions matter profoundly for currency stability, and the future trajectory of the dollar will hinge on the balance struck between economic growth, inflation control, and the credibility of the institutions that govern money in the modern age.